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Abstract
Moving in a co-ordinated fashion with another individual changes our behaviour towards them; we tend to like them more,
find them more attractive, and are more willing to co-operate with them. It is generally assumed that this effect on
behaviour results from alterations in representations of self and others. Specifically, through neurophysiological perception-
action matching mechanisms, interpersonal motor co-ordination (IMC) is believed to forge a neural coupling between actor
and observer, which serves to blur boundaries in conceptual self-other representations and causes positive views of the self
to be projected onto others. An investigation into this potential neural mechanism is lacking, however. Moreover, the
specific components of IMC that might influence this mechanism have not yet been specified. In the present study we
exploited a robust behavioural phenomenon – automatic imitation – to assess the degree to which IMC influences neural
action observation-execution matching mechanisms. This revealed that automatic imitation is reduced when the actions of
another individual are perceived to be synchronised in time, but are spatially incongruent, with our own. We interpret our
findings as evidence that IMC does indeed exert an effect on neural perception-action matching mechanisms, but this
serves to promote better self-other distinction. Our findings demonstrate that further investigation is required to understand
the complex relationship between neural perception-action coupling, conceptual self-other representations, and social
behaviour.
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Introduction
Humans have a tendency to co-ordinate their movements and
behaviours with those of their interaction partners non-conscious-
ly. We either co-ordinate our own movements in time (synchrony),
or we adopt the actions of those with whom we are interacting
(mimicry; for reviews see [1] [2] [3]). There is a general consensus
that both types of behaviour – herein referred to collectively as
interpersonal motor co-ordination (IMC) – serve an important
social function; namely, to promote social cohesion and affiliation
[1]. Consistent with this perspective, performing synchronously
with another individual, either consciously or unintentionally,
engenders co-operative, altruistic, and affiliative behaviour
towards them [4] [5] [6] [7]. Likewise, whether spontaneous or
intentional, mimicry is shown to increase positive attitudes
between mimicker and mimickee (for reviews see [2] [8]), and
positive outcomes from social interactions (e.g. negotiations [9]
[10]). These studies demonstrate that both forms of IMC are
capable of modifying subsequent social behaviour. The task now is
to elucidate the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, and this
was the aim of the current investigation.
It has long been postulated that one’s own and others’ actions
are coded in a common representational space [11] [3]. Recent
neurophysiological research supports this notion by revealing
extensive spatial overlap in neural representations for self- and
other-action; observing another individual performing an action
engages our own neural motor circuits involved in executing that
same action [12] [13] [14]. It is proposed that such ‘‘resonance’’ of
neural motor systems during action observation activates corre-
sponding intentional representations, permitting us to infer the
actor’s goals and intentions [15], and, by extension, their mental
and emotional states [16] [17]. Inferring that others are acting in
way that conforms to our own intentions should promote a sense
of affiliation. In this light, when our interaction partners perform
actions that are synchronous or co-ordinated with our own, this
should lead to the impression of shared mental and emotional
states, and feelings of closeness and similarity [18]. In other words,
during IMC, the activation of overlapping neural representations
for self- and other-action may serve to blur boundaries in higher-
level conceptual self-other representations, providing a mechanism
through which positive views of the self are projected onto others
[19] [20].
In line with this proposal, synchronised movements appear to
blur cognitive self-other representations [21] and foster judgments
of similarity and entitativity [22] [23] [24]. Furthermore, a similar
effect is observed following multi-sensory stimulation; when we
observe another individual exposed to tactile stimulation that is
synchronized to that which we ourselves are experiencing, our
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bodily self-representation appears to extend and incorporate the
other. In addition to this ‘‘enfacement’’ effect, we are more likely
to perceive the other as similar to ourselves and experience greater
closeness towards them [25] [26] [27]. As such, these studies
demonstrate that perceiving synchrony between our own and
another’s body influences both self-other overlap in bodily
representations and social processing. Importantly, observing
another individual being touched engages our own neural
somatosensory circuits [28] [29] [30], suggesting that spatially
overlapping neural self-other sensory representations underlie this
effect. Taken together, such research suggests that IMC might
influence behaviour by enhancing ‘‘self-other equivalence’’ in
neural action representations [4]. To our knowledge, however, no
investigation has explored this directly.
A large corpus of studies have demonstrated that one’s own
actions are influenced greatly when we observe simultaneously
those of another; we are quicker and more accurate performing
actions that are congruent with those observed, while observing
incongruent actions interferes greatly with our own action
execution (for a comprehensive review see [31]). Importantly,
the influence of others’ actions on our own occurs even when it is
detrimental to the task at hand. It is considered, therefore, to
reflect an automatic tendency to imitate the actions of others. As
such, automatic imitation (AI) is considered an experimental
manifestation of non-conscious mimicry [2] [8]. Furthermore,
neuroscientific studies reveal that this influence of another’s
actions on our own is driven directly by neural action observation-
execution matching mechanisms [32] [33] [34]. Automatic
imitation, then, also provides a method to investigate behaviorally
if IMC alters social behaviour through its influence on these neural
perception-action coupling mechanisms [31]. Recent studies that
report an enhancement of AI following priming with pro-social
(e.g. group, team, friend) relative to non-social word stimuli [35]
[36] [37] validate such an approach (see [2]).
We utilized AI as a means to investigate behaviourally whether
IMC exerts an effect on neural perception-action coupling
mechanisms, and how this relates to subsequent social behaviour.
Using electromyography, we examined whether observing an-
other’s actions that match those we ourselves are executing
simultaneously alters subsequent AI. Furthermore, we instructed
individuals to perform their actions while observing an actor
performing the same actions synchronously or asynchronously, or
a different action synchronized temporally. By phase-shifting the
observed actions relative to those executed, we were able isolate
the temporal component of IMC; and by presenting different
movements performed synchronously with the observers’, we
manipulated separately the spatial characteristics of IMC. This
permitted us to explore whether AI is influenced more by the
spatial or temporal correspondence between our own actions and
those of another (mimicry and synchrony, respectively). Finally,
given that subjective perceptions of synchrony are reported to be
more accurate than objective measures at predicting the subse-
quent effects on behaviour [5], we explored the influence of IMC
on AI according to subjective reports.
Since prosocial behaviour is increased even when mimickers
and synchronous partners are absent or inferred [5] [38], the
actor’s actions were presented by video. This allowed us to
manipulate IMC whilst controlling for other potentially confound-
ing social factors (e.g. familiarity, interaction). Furthermore,
subjects were given no information concerning the actor’s
intentions, and they were instructed explicitly to execute their
movements in time with an auditory rhythmic stimulus rather than
the actor’s actions. By removing any instruction or intention to
synchronise, we were able to investigate IMC as it occurs
naturally. The present study, then, explored the effect of IMC
on one individual’s neural action observation-execution mecha-
nisms by manipulating the degree to which their actions
corresponded to those of another individual in space and/or time.
Materials and Methods
Sample
The sample comprised 72 students (21 Males; mean
age = 22.3 yrs, range = 19–36) recruited from various faculties of
Masaryk University, Czech Republic. All participants were right-
handed, reporting normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Written informed consent
was obtained from every participant prior to the study, and the
procedure was approved by the Ethics Review Board of St. Anne’s
Hospital, Brno.
Procedure
The experimental procedure comprised two stages: An initial
period of interpersonal motor co-ordination (IMC) was followed
immediately by a measurement of automatic imitation (AI).
Throughout both stages, participants remained seated in a
comfortable chair positioned 1 metre from a 240 computer
monitor located on a table in front of them. Before the first stage
commenced, electrodes for electromyographic recordings were
secured in place and the participant underwent 10 practice trials of
the AI procedure (see below). Familiarising the participants with
this latter aspect of the procedure at this early stage minimised
errors on the task, and the gap between the two procedural phases.
1. Interpersonal Motor Co-ordination
In each of eight blocks, participants were instructed to perform
one of two movements in time with an audible rhythm recording.
In four of the blocks they were asked to tap the table in front of
them with the index finger of their right hand; in the other half of
the blocks, they were required to move from side to side their right
hand in a waving action, with their arm positioned vertically and
elbow resting on the chair arm rest, palm facing forwards. In both
finger-tapping and hand-waving blocks, participants’ left hand
rested in their lap. To ensure participants engaged fully in the task
and to encourage perceptions of synchronicity, the audible
recording presented during each block comprised one of two
rhythms. Both rhythms lasted ,60 secs and consisted of 12
repetitions of a 5-beat cycle, but differed slightly in their metric
pattern.
Whilst performing the actions, participants observed the video-
taped actions of an unfamiliar female actor on the monitor.
Stimuli subtended a visual angle of 19.9615.9u. In two conditions
the video presented the actor performing the same hand-waving or
finger-tapping actions as the participant, but with varying degrees
of synchronicity. In the Synch condition, the actions were
performed to the same audible rhythm aligned precisely to that
followed by the participant; that is, stimuli were presented in-phase
(0u phase shift). In the Asynch condition, the actor’s actions followed
the same rhythm but phase-shifted; specifically, since only in-phase
and anti-phase interpersonal synchrony is capable of modifying
subsequent behaviour [22] [39], asynchronous stimuli were phase-
shifted by ,60–80u. Importantly, the degree of phase varied
between videos but remained constant throughout each video.
This way the actions of the actor and participant did not fall into
synchrony with one another at any time during stimuli comprising
the Asynch condition. In the Temp condition, the actor performed
the opposite action to that of the participant (i.e. hand-waving
actions while the participant executed finger-tapping, and vice
Temporal Synchrony Influences Automatic Imitation
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versa), but to the same rhythm aligned precisely to that followed by
the participant – i.e. in-phase. In other words, during the Temp
condition participants observed different actions to their own but
performed in temporal synchrony. Finally, in the Control condition
the actor remained still throughout; her arm remained motionless
in the vertical position during the hand-waving blocks, and her
hand rested motionless on the table in front of her during the
finger-tapping blocks. At the end of each block participants were
also asked to rate on a 5-point scale the degree to which they felt
the actor’s actions were synchronised ‘‘in time’’ with their own
(1 = completely unsynchronised, 2 = partly unsynchronised, 3 = partly syn-
chronised, 4 =mostly synchronised, 5 = perfectly synchronised).
To ensure equal attention was paid to all types of stimuli, and to
encourage focus on the actor’s movements, 2–4 small white dots
were presented briefly (100 msec) in the vicinity of the actor’s
moving hand or finger. Participants were asked to count the
number of dots, and instructed to report the number of dots at the
end of each block. Snapshots of the visual stimuli are presented in
Figure 1.
2. Automatic Imitation
To measure automatic imitation we employed a typical
stimulus-response compatibility procedure, in which the stimulus
set included photographic images of the actions comprising the
response set [40] [41]. With their right arm now positioned beside
them, resting horizontally on the arm rest, participants were
instructed to execute as fast as possible hand-opening or -closing
actions in response to coloured dots. Participants were instructed
to begin each trial with their hand in a ‘start’ position, in which the
fingers and thumb were extended parallel to one another, forward
facing. From this position, they were told to execute a hand-
opening or -closing response as soon as they observed a green or
red dot on the screen, respectively. The former action involved the
extension and splaying of the fingers away from the palm, while
the latter was achieved by rolling the fingers into a fist (see
Figure 1).
The beginning of every trial was signalled by the presentation of
the same female actor seated at the same table as before, her hand
in the start position but her arm perpendicular to the table. This
‘warning’ stimulus was presented for 800, 1600, or 2400 msec,
after which the actor’s hand changed to the end-point of the same
hand-opening or –closing movement comprising the response set.
The coloured dots were presented superimposed over the actor’s
hand at the exact time it changed from the start position to the
movement end-point. This meant that imperative stimuli (col-
oured dots) were presented alongside the task-irrelevant actions of
the actor. On compatible trials, the actor performed the same
action signalled by the imperative stimuli, while incompatible trials
presented an incongruent action.
The shift from start position to movement end-point produced
apparent motion. These static stimuli were selected over videos
because (1) it allowed us to eliminate the possibility of unavoidable
cues as to the upcoming movement (e.g. changes in the actor’s
posture or facial expression), and (2) automatic imitation has been
demonstrated repeatedly with static stimuli [31]. The action end-
point and imperative stimuli were presented for 1500 msec. With
Figure 1. Visual stimuli. (A) Snapshots of the stimuli presented during the four hand-waving blocks of the IMC phase. Two instances of dots are
presented (top and bottom frames) to illustrate that the dot-counting task demanded attention towards the actor’s actions. (B) Stimuli comprising
the AI phase. Each trial began with the warning stimulus (top), after which the imperative stimulus (coloured dot) was presented, superimposed over
congruent (middle) or incongruent (bottom) actions. NB: The actor has provided written informed consent, as outlined in the PLOS consent form, for
the publication of this image. Although her identity is concealed in this figure, her eyes were visible throughout all experimental stimuli.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084820.g001
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the actor’s arm positioned vertically, their hand-opening and -
closing actions involved moving their fingers along the horizontal
plane, orthogonal to that of the participants’. This eliminated the
possibility of spatial-compatible effects [42] [43]. Participants
underwent two blocks of 60 trials, 30 congruent and 30
incongruent. Errors (i.e. hand-opening or -closing on a hand-
closing or -opening trial, respectively) were recorded manually.
Prosociality
As measures of prosociality, at the end of the procedure we
asked our participants to rate the actor on two dimensions, both
measured on a five-point Likert scale. First they were asked how
likeable they considered the actor to be ‘‘in real life’’ (1 = ‘‘Extremely
unlikeable, we would never become friends’’; 5 = ‘‘Extremely likeable, we could
become close friends very quickly’’). This is analogous to the measure of
likeability used elsewhere [4] [44]. Then we obtained a measure of
willingness to co-operate. We assumed that our attitudes towards
another individual drive our judgements concerning the efficacy of
co-operating with them, and, therefore, our willingness to co-
operate with them. On the basis of this assumption, participants
were given the following (written) hypothetical scenario: ‘‘Imagine
that you and the same actor are asked to build a complicated 3-dimensional
structure from LEGOH. You must give verbal instructions to the actor, who
must follow your instructions blindfolded. How successful do you think this co-
operation would be?’’ (1 = ‘‘Completely unsuccessful, we would never achieve
the task’’; 5 = ‘‘Completely successful, we would achieve the task in minimal
time’’).
Electromyography
Using AG/AgCl surface electrodes positioned in a belly-tendon
montage, we recorded the onset of hand-opening and -closing
actions by recording the electromyograph (EMG) from the first
dorsal interosseus muscle of the right hand. The EMG was
amplified and sampled at 1024 Hz, with no filtering applied. The
signal was segmented into 2000 msec epochs, comprising a
500 msec baseline period and encompassing the signal recorded
during the following 1500 msec post-imperative period. Within
each epoch, reaction time was defined as the onset of a hand
movement. This was measured by moving in 1 msec increments a
20 msec sliding window through the post-imperative period;
movement onset was defined as the start of the first window in
which the standard deviation for that window, and that of the next
window, exceeded 2.5 times that of the baseline. An individual
who was blind to the trial type inspected each epoch visually,
rejecting any trial in which movement onset was not identified
accurately.
Results
Due to a poor electromyogram resulting from electrode
displacement during the performance of the hand actions, we
were forced to omit from our analyses the recording of one
participant. In order to maximise the number of trials comprising
each trial type (i.e. Incongruent and Congruent) we also excluded
from our analyses three subjects who made more than 10 errors.
In the sections that follow, we report the results of parametric
statistical analyses unless the assumptions of normality and/or
homogeneity of variance were violated. Measures are presented as
means (6 standard deviation). Figure 2 illustrates the primary
findings of our analyses.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our manipulation we performed
a one-way ANOVA on ratings of Perceived Synchronicity (PS)
summed over all eight blocks (max. = 40), with Condition as a
between-subject factor. Since PS ratings were not acquired for the
Control condition, we examined only the Synch, Asynch and
Temp conditions. This revealed a main effect of Condition
(F(2,48) = 55.00, p,.001; g
2 = .70), with post-hoc tests (Tukey’s
HSD) revealing significant differences between the Synch (33.06
[63.36]) and Asynch condition (19.35 [64.31]; p,.001), and the
Asynch and Temp (29.94 [64.32]) conditions (p,.001). Surpris-
ingly, a Kruskal–Wallis test revealed no Condition effect on ratings
of likeability (H(3) = 2.88, p= .42; Synch= 2.94 [6.66],
Asynch= 2.82 [6.53], Temp= 2.94 [6.54], and Control = 2.65
[6.70]) or willingness to co-operate (H(3) = 3.16, p = .37;
Synch= 3.71 [6.67], Asynch= 3.35 [6.86], Temp= 3.76
[6.83], and Control = 2.75 [6.77]). When we performed a
median split on the basis of PS ratings, however, a Bonferroni-
corrected Mann-Whitney test revealed significantly higher will-
ingness to co-operate in individuals with higher (3.85 [6.60])
relative to lower PS ratings (3.33 [6.92]; U= 229, pcorr = .046).
Furthermore, although not significant, we observed greater
likeability ratings for participants with high PS ratings (2.96
[6.59]) compared with those in the Control condition (2.65
[6.70]; U= 168, pcorr = .094).
To assess whether equivalent attention was paid to all types of
stimuli, we examined performance on the dot-counting task by
adding the reported number of dots counted across all eight
blocks. This revealed a very small number of errors in all
conditions; of the 27 dots presented across all blocks, the mean
number of totals errors in the Synch, Asynch, Temp and Control
condition was only 1.71 (61.45), 2.29 (61.16),.88 (61.05), and
1.53 (6.94), respectively. Applying a non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test to the number of dot-counting errors, however, with
Condition a between-subject factor, revealed a significant effect
(H(3) = 13.15, p = .004). Bonferroni-corrected follow-up tests re-
vealed that this was driven by the difference between the Temp
condition and the Asynch (pcorr = .007) and Control (pcorr = .030)
conditions.
We turn now to our assessment of automatic imitation (AI). As
expected, a two-way ANOVA, with Condition a between-subject
factor and trial type (Trial) a within-subject factor, confirmed that
more errors were made on incongruent (4.07 [62.07]) compared
with congruent trials (1.26 [61.36]; F(1,64) = 79.74, p,.001). The
same test confirmed that the number of errors were equivalent
across all conditions, however – there was no effect of Condition
(F(3,64) = 1.29, p = .29), and no Condition-by-Trial interaction
(F(3,64) = .59, p = .62). As a measure of AI, we subtracted reaction
times on congruent trials from those on incongruent trials. As
such, larger values represent greater AI. A one-way ANOVA
observed a significant main effect of Condition on AI
(F(3,64) = 3.23, p = .028, g
2 = .13), with post-hoc tests (Tukey’s
HSD) revealing a slight decrease in the Synch compared with the
Asynch condition (39.43 [627.36] vs. 60.22 [624.94] msec,
respectively; p = .09), and a significant decrease in the Temp
(37.07 [623.88] msec) relative to the Asynch condition (p = .048;
Control = 53.25 [625.38] msec). Interestingly, this decrease in AI
following the Synch and Temp conditions relative to the Asynch
condition was present in the first testing block (F(3,64) = 3.26,
p = .027, g2 = .13; Temp [38.60624.40] vs. Asynch
[64.75629.07], p = .029; Synch [42.62629.95] vs. Asynch,
p = .084; Control = 52.86 [622.68]) but not in the second
(F(3,64) = 1.90, p = .138; Synch= 37.23 [630.58], Asynch= 55.08
[627.37], Temp= 35.42 [627.72], Control = 52.32 [634.83]). A
2-way ANOVA, however, with Condition a between-subject
factor and Block a within-subject factor, revealed no main effect of
Block (F(1,64) = 2.11, p = .15), nor a Block-by-Condition interaction
(F(1,64) = 0.36, p = .78). For this reason, the following analyses were
performed on AI collapsed across both testing blocks.
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Spearman correlations revealed no relationships between AI
and likeability (rs =2.12, p = .35) or willingness to co-operate
(rs =2.01, p= .86). Likewise, a median split of AI values revealed
no significant difference between participants with low relative to
high AI in either willingness to co-operate (3.62 vs. 3.47,
respectively; U= 524.50, p= .24) or likeability (2.82 vs. 2.85,
respectively; U= 568, p = .49).
Next, we examined whether the modulation of AI was simply a
result of the attention (i.e. dot-counting) effect. Specifically, we
performed ANCOVA to see whether the reduction in AI between
the Temp and Asynch conditions remained when the number of
dot-counting errors was treated as a covariate. A significant
Condition effect on AI (F(3,63) = 6.37, p,.001, g
2 = .23) confirmed
that the modulation of AI was independent of dot-counting
performance. The corrected means (6 SE) for the Synch, Asynch,
Temp and Control conditions over both testing blocks were 36.10
(65.82), 64.21 (65.85), 32.49 (65.89) and 57.21 (65.89) msec,
respectively.
Given the apparent importance of the temporal aspect of IMC,
we decided to examine the relationship between AI and PS for
individuals comprising the three conditions in which PS ratings
were obtained (Temp, Synch and Asynch). This revealed a weak
but significant negative association (ß =21.05, t =22.01, p = .05,
R2= .08), indicating that AI decreased with increasing subjective
ratings of synchrony. As a final step we investigated whether or not
PS served as a mediator of the Condition effect on AI. To assess
this we implemented a mediation analysis capable of estimating
the direct, indirect, and total effects of multicategorical variables
on continuous outcome measures (MEDIATE SPSS Macro) [45].
Through indicator (‘‘dummy’’) coding, this tool permitted us to
capture the three relevant levels of Condition by modelling each as
a predictor variable. In light of the above ANOVA results, the
Asynch condition served as a reference against which the other
levels were compared. In doing so, we were able to compare
simultaneously the relative indirect effects of PS on AI when
observing actions that are synchronous with our own either
spatially and temporally (Synch) or temporally only (Temp),
relative to asynchronous actions (Asynch). The statistical signifi-
cance of indirect effects via the mediator variable is assessed with
percentile confidence intervals from a bootstrapping procedure. In
the current implementation, since both 95% intervals contained
zero, the indirect effect cannot be considered to differ significantly
from zero and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: although
subjective perceptions of synchrony are related negatively to AI,
they do not mediate the Condition effect. These results are
presented in Table 1.
Discussion
In this study we set out to investigate whether interpersonal
motor co-ordination (IMC) influences neural perception-action
coupling mechanisms. To do so, we examined whether IMC
Figure 2. Primary results. (A and B) Results of Mann-Whitney tests, revealing a greater willingness to co-operate and enhanced likeability ratings in
participants who provided higher ratings of PS; * = p,.05. (C) Results of one-way ANOVA, illustrating reduced AI in the Temp compared with the
Asynch condition. Error bars present standard error; * = p,.05. (D) Results of the regression analysis, illustrating that AI decreases as a function of
increasing subjective ratings of synchronicity. Regression line: AI=21.05 PS+74.49.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084820.g002
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influences automatic imitation (AI) – a behavioural phenomenon
that has been shown to result from the resonance of neural motor
circuits during action observation [31] [32] [33] [34]. Our data
reveal three interesting findings. Firstly, consistent with many
previous studies [4] [7] [23] our operationalisation of IMC was
successful in enhancing positive attitudes towards the actor;
specifically, we observed a greater willingness to cooperate with
the actor when their actions were perceived to be more
synchronised in time with the participants’. Secondly, AI was
reduced following a short period of observing the actor’s actions
when they were synchronous with the observers’, relative to those
that were asynchronous. Third, the relative increase in willingness
to co-operate and reduction of AI was most evident when the
observed actions were synchronised temporally with those
executed, but differed in their spatial kinematics (i.e. the Temp
condition). Furthermore, AI decreased with increasing subjective
judgements of temporal synchronicity. This attenuation of AI was
unrelated to either of our measures of pro-sociality, however. We
interpret our findings as evidence that IMC does indeed influence
neural perception-action coupling mechanisms, but this manifests
as enhanced self-other distinction rather than overlap. Moreover,
the way in which such modification of neural self-other
representations influences social behaviour is less straightforward
than generally assumed. Before we can begin to consider possible
mechanisms driving this effect, we must first address some
potential methodological explanations.
Although very small in magnitude, we observed a greater
accuracy on the dot-counting task in the Temp relative to the
Asynch and Control conditions. At first glance it might appear as
though our modulation of AI is an artefact of differential attention
paid to the stimuli defining these conditions. This would be
consistent with studies that report preferential attention for
interaction partners that move synchronously relative to those
that move asynchronously with ourselves [46]. Importantly,
however, our modulation of AI remained significant after
controlling for this attention effect. Moreover, given that this
difference in dot-counting would reflect increased attention to the
stimuli defining the Temp condition, we consider this explanation
insufficient; if greater attention was paid to the synchronous
compared with the asynchronous stimuli, why should they
influence subsequent behaviour to a lesser degree?
Instead, our results suggest that this dot-counting difference
reflects the difficulty of the task under these two conditions.
Precisely because of AI, counting the dots (and therefore attending
to the actor’s actions) in the Asynch condition interfered with
movement timing. In contrast, participants in the Temp condition
could use the actions of the actor to assist them on both tasks – to
predict where the next dot would occur and to keep in time with
the auditory stimulus. The question still remains, however, why
performance on the dot-counting task during the Asynch condition
did not differ also from that measured during the Synch condition.
Our interpretation would suggest that others’ actions interfere less
with our own when they are synchronised temporally but differ in
their spatial kinematics. This makes intuitive sense: Joint-action
tasks often require us to perform actions that are distinct from
those of our interaction partner, but co-ordinated in time. While
temporal synchronicity would facilitate this by allowing us to
predict our partner’s subsequent actions [3] [15], the tendency to
imitate the spatial aspects of their actions would be detrimental.
A more feasible methodological explanation for our pattern of
results relates to the findings of [6]. These authors discovered that
a period of acting synchronously with another individual enhanced
perceptual sensitivity, as measured by improved performance on a
visuo-motor task. Perhaps the temporal co-ordination between the
actor’s and subjects’ actions comprising the Temp condition
served to hone our participants’ visuo-motor skills. This would
allow them to respond more accurately to the imperative stimuli
and ignore more easily the task-irrelevant, conflicting actions of
the actor, thereby decreasing AI. This explanation can be tested
empirically in a simple extension of our study. [42] [43] [47]
observed AI even when subjects were instructed to produce a
single, pre-defined movement in response to simple imperative
stimuli. In these studies, subjects were required to make a single
response in each block – either a hand-opening or -closing action –
as soon as the imperative stimulus appeared. The imperative
stimulus in these studies was a hand performing either the same
(congruent trials) or opposite movement (incongruent trials) as the
predefined action. In other words, these authors report AI even
when the demands of stimulus-response mapping are minimised. If
the shift in AI we have revealed following temporal synchrony is
driven by enhanced perceptual sensitivity, we would expect this
effect to be less evident in such a measure of AI.
Let us now speculate on some potential neurophysiological
mechanisms that might underlie our manipulation of AI. One
particular brain network is assumed frequently to be a likely
candidate for producing ‘‘self-other equivalence’’ [4]. Within the
mirror neuron system (MNS), observing the actions of others
engages the observer’s own neural motor circuits in a correspond-
ing fashion [12] [13] [14]. Within this brain system, then, others’
actions are coded and represented in the same way as our own,
creating a neural coupling between actor and observer [4]. For this
reason primarily, the MNS is assumed generally to serve as the
primary neurophysiological mechanism through which IMC
influences subsequent social behaviour [2] [3] [4] [18]. In support
of this, imitative behaviour engages the MNS maximally [48].
Furthermore, temporary disruption to the MNS reduces AI [32],
suggesting that AI is a product of the automatic resonance of
motor circuits during action observation. It follows that if IMC
influences social behaviour via MNS functions, IMC should also
enhance AI. The findings of our study do not support this
prediction, however, pointing to the involvement of alternative
neurophysiological mechanisms.
One alternative mechanism is suggested by studies that have
compared brain function during congruent and incongruent trials
on the same stimulus-response compatibility procedure employed
here. These studies have revealed the areas of the brain involved in
the control of automatic imitation; in particular, inhibiting the
tendency to imitate engages the medial prefrontal cortex and
temporo-parietal junction [49] [50] [51] [52]. Patients with
damage to these structures demonstrate stronger imitative
response tendencies than those with damage to other brain
regions [53]. Interestingly, these same brain systems are implicated
heavily in high-level social cognitive processes, such as mentalising,
perspective taking, and self-referential processing [54] [55] [56]
Table 1. Estimates of mediatory effect of perceived
synchronicity.
Condition* Effect SE CIlower CIupper
Synch 4.24 11.44 215.08 22.24
Temp 5.49 14.71 218.89 29.42
Estimate values after 1000 bootstrapped resamples.
* = The Asynch condition served as the reference group;
SE = standard error; CIlower and CIupper = 95% lower- and upper-level confidence
interval, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084820.t001
Temporal Synchrony Influences Automatic Imitation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e84820
[57]. As such, the neural mechanisms involved in the control of
imitative response tendencies overlap with those underlying
sophisticated self-other representations involved in meta-cognitive
processes [51] [55]. In line with this, a study by [58] suggests that
individuals with autism – a developmental disorder characterised
in part by deficits of mentalising and perspective taking, and
functional alterations in corresponding brain structures – may
exhibit larger AI than healthy controls. It seems feasible to
conclude that greater imitative tendencies in these individuals are
the result of dysfunction in neural systems involved in high-level
self-other representational systems.
Continuing with this notion of imitative control, our study
demonstrates that observing actions co-ordinated temporally with
our own inhibit subsequent AI more than those synchronised both
in time and in space. We argue that the spatial discrepancy
between the observed and executed actions in the Temp condition
served to permit better self-other distinction. Although the timing of
the actor’s movements in this condition assisted individuals in
maintaining synchrony with the auditory rhythm, the spatially
incongruent movements also trained participants to inhibit the
tendency to imitate. In this sense, it is entirely conceivable that our
Temp condition operated in an analogous manner to the
imitation-inhibition training implemented by [59]; these authors
report that training participants to overcome the automatic
tendency to imitate others not only reduced AI, but also improved
perspective-taking ability. This interesting effect is attributed to
improvements in self-other distinction, allowing participants to
resist the influence of others’ actions on their own motor planning
on one hand, while on the other enabling them to distinguish
between their own and others’ perspectives. The results of our
study can be seen as an extension of this work to the domain of
IMC, whereby the observation of spatially incongruous but
temporally synchronised actions reduce AI and enhance positive
social attitudes. The questions remains whether the same brain
systems involved in imitative control also underlie the attenuating
effect of IMC on AI observed in the present study, and how this
influences social behaviours. This demands further neuroscientific
investigation.
Moreover, to make the claim that our manipulation of AI
reflects improved self-other distinction, it is necessary to examine
whether such an effect corresponds to other measures of self-other
representation. Studies have utilised the ‘‘enfacement’’ effect to
explore the expansion of bodily self-representations [25] [26] [27],
the ‘‘self-referencing’’ effect to demonstrate self-other merging in
memory [24], and the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) scale [60]
[61] to capture subjective feelings of self-other overlap [25]. Future
investigations are needed to explore whether the alterations in a
behavioural index of neural self-other representations following
IMC that we have demonstrated are reflected also in these higher-
level measures of self-other overlap.
Nevertheless, the findings of the present study offer an
important contribution not only to research concerning IMC,
but also to our understanding of self-representation. Participants in
our Temp condition experienced temporally but not spatially
correlated visuo-motor inputs. This condition, then, is analogous
partly to the multi-sensory stimulation used by [62]. These authors
report ‘‘enfacement’’, enhanced perceptions of physical similarity,
and greater feelings of closeness when they experienced unrelated
but temporally synchronous visual and tactile stimulation. Such
overlapping bodily representations may allow us to ‘‘feel’’ first-
hand the sensory experiences of others (e.g. pain). Like this and
other related studies [25] [26] [27], our findings suggest that self-
representations are flexible rather than stable, and malleable to
temporally synchronised multi-sensory input. In the action domain,
however, temporal synchronicity appears to permit better self-
other distinction rather than overlap. This, conceivably, is more
adaptive for real-life co-operative interactions, whereby we must
act in a manner that complements rather than mirrors the motor
behaviour of our interaction partners.
Finally, although we observed a significant increase in
willingness to co-operate in those reporting more relative to less
perceive temporal synchrony between their own actions and those
of the actor, there was no such modulation of likeability. Further,
we revealed no relationship between AI and liking, despite
employing a measure similar to that used elsewhere [4] [44]. We
interpret this according to methodological differences between
these studies and our own. First, to isolate the effects of spatial and
temporal motor co-ordination we employed stimuli that prevented
any social interaction between the actor and observer. Perhaps,
however, it is through social interaction (e.g. eye-contact, sharing
facial expressions, and exchanging utterances) that we express the
sharing of an experience necessary to engender feelings of
similarity and closeness. Importantly, the positive effects of IMC
on social behaviour appear to be modulated by perceptions of
similarity [21] [23]; perceptions of dissimilarity and other negative
attitudes towards interaction partners reduces the potential for
synchronicity [21], the frequency of mimicry [63] [64] [65] [66],
and the potential for these variables to modify subsequent social
behaviour [64] [65]. Secondly, subjects were aware that the stimuli
were offline videos of the actor; although synchronised with their
own movements, they were aware that the actor had performed
her actions in the past. Such awareness might have limited the
degree to which overlapping neural self-other action representa-
tions were capable of modulating subsequent social behaviour
towards the actor. Although we can mentalise and empathise with
real-life characters on the TV, we have a meta-cognitive awareness
that their experiences have occurred in the past and in no way
relate to those we ourselves are experiencing in the present. This
may prevent any enhancement of feelings of closeness, similarity,
or affiliation. To investigate this further, we suggest an extension of
our study in which the actor is present and in contact with the
observer during the IMC phase, and performs the task-irrelevant
hand actions in real-time during AI assessment.
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